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As her inevitable death from brain cancer approached, a 
42-year-old lawyer named Lecretia Seales wanted the option 
of receiving aid in dying from her (unnamed) general 
practitioner, who in turn was willing to provide that aid.1 
Seales’ own actions would not breach the law; it has not 
been an offence in New Zealand for anyone to attempt 
to end her or his own life since 1961. However, should a 
doctor aid Seales to do so, she or he ran the risk of arrest 
and prosecution for breaching the Crimes Act 1961. A 
doctor who directly administers a lethal dose of medication 
at Seales’ request for the purpose of ending her life might 
be prosecuted for murder or manslaughter under section 
160 of the Crimes Act. Providing Seales with a lethal dose 
of medication in the knowledge she may self-administer 
it to end her life some time in the future might lead to a 
prosecution for aiding or abetting suicide under section 179.
In order to provide her doctor with legal 
certainty, Seales sought declarations in the 
High Court regarding the current law’s 
application to her situation. In essence, 
she wanted the court to find that a doctor 
who provides aid in dying at the request of 
a terminally ill, competent individual falls 
outside the above provisions of the Crimes 
Act. Alternatively, if the court could not 
make such a declaration, Seales wanted it 
to find that the law’s effect in preventing 
her from gaining access to aid in dying is 
inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. The resultant judgment 
by Justice Collins in Seales v Attorney 
General 2 thereby provides us with a 
somewhat definitive statement of the 
present law, as well as important findings 
about that law’s justifiability.
The reach of the Crimes Act
In regards to the first issue – whether 
the Crimes Act’s prohibitions cover the 
actions of a doctor who supplies aid 
in dying directly to a patient, or who 
gives it to a patient to self-administer at 
a later date – Justice Collins answered 
in the affirmative. His honour found 
that a doctor who directly administers a 
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fatal drug to Seales with the intention of 
terminating her life breaches section 160 
by killing another person through an 
‘unlawful act’ (Seales, at [112]). Somewhat 
strangely, the exact nature of that unlawful 
act was not specified; his honour suggested 
that the doctor ‘probably’ would commit 
an assault on Seales, or ‘in all likelihood’ 
would administer a poison with the intent 
to cause grevious bodily harm (Seales, at 
[113]-[114]). Nevertheless, his honour 
was satisfied that, under section 160, 
a doctor’s direct administration of aid 
in dying would amount to murder or 
manslaughter.
By the same token, Justice Collins also 
ruled that the section 179 prohibition on 
aiding or abetting suicide covers providing 
the means to self-administer aid in dying. 
His honour found that the legislative 
provision’s intent was to preserve ‘the 
sanctity of human life’, not simply to 
protect the vulnerable in society (Seales, 
at [132]). As such, Seales’ decision to take 
a fatal drug with the intention of ending 
her own life would constitute a ‘suicide’ 
under the Crimes Act as her death would 
be intentional, voluntary and caused by 
the drug taken (Seales, at [144]). A doctor 
who provided her with a fatal drug 
knowing she was contemplating using it 
to end her own life would thus fall foul 
of section 179 (Seales, at [145]).
Justice Collins’ interpretation of the 
Crimes Act provisions is an orthodox, 
albeit conservative, one. It certainly was 
not the only way the legislation could have 
been read (Tucker and Geddis, 2015). 
Nevertheless, his honour’s judgment is 
dispositive of the question whether any 
form of aid in dying currently is permitted 
under the Crimes Act 1961. It is not.
Consistency with the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act
Having found that the Crimes Act could 
not be interpreted in a manner that 
permitted aid in dying, Justice Collins then 
turned to examine whether this outcome 
is consistent with the rights and freedoms 
contained in the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act. Two rights were at issue: the 
section 8 right not to be deprived of life; 
and the section 9 right not to be subjected 
to cruel, degrading or disproportionately 
severe treatment.
Regarding section 8, a unanimous 
Canadian Supreme Court recently held 
that a total prohibition on aid in dying 
breached the equivalent guarantee in 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (which is, in turn, the model 
for our Bill of Rights Act).3 It found that 
the prohibition’s effect was to cause some 
terminally ill people to end their lives 
sooner than they otherwise would choose 
to and it was not necessary to impose 
this outcome on competent, consenting, 
terminally ill individuals in order to 
protect generally the lives of vulnerable 
members of society.
Although this Canadian precedent is 
not binding in New Zealand, the links 
between our New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act and the Canadian Charter imbue it 
with very strong persuasive authority. 
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Justice Collins 
accepted that a prohibition on aid in dying 
has the same potential consequence in 
New Zealand regarding individuals ending 
their lives prematurely (Seales, at [166]). 
However, his honour then found that 
this consequence did not breach Seales’ 
section 8 right to life, as, in distinction 
to Canada, any deprivation of life was ‘on 
such grounds as ... are consistent with the 
principles of fundamental justice’ (Seales, 
at [186], [191]).
With respect, this conclusion is hard 
to sustain. Justice Collins based his 
contrasting treatment of the right on 
an alleged difference in intent behind 
Canada’s and New Zealand’s criminal law 
prohibition on assisting suicide. Canada’s 
legislature was concerned only to protect 
the lives of vulnerable individuals, while 
New Zealand’s wanted to protect the 
lives of all persons. Therefore, his honour 
concluded, it is not inconsistent with 
the principles of fundamental justice 
for New Zealand’s prohibition to apply 
more broadly and capture individuals in 
Lecretia Seales’ position.
I think this is wrong (Geddis, 2015). 
His Honour’s basis for distinguishing 
between the Canadian and New Zealand 
parliamentary intent is somewhat flimsy. 
Furthermore, by accepting a broad, generic 
legislative purpose such as ‘protecting the 
sanctity of life’, the analysis of whether the 
effect of the law in question is consistent 
with the principles of fundamental 
justice is hopelessly short-circuited.4 At 
no point, therefore, does Justice Collins 
confront the important question: why 
should the state have in place a law that 
causes competent, rational, terminally 
ill individuals to take their own lives 
early? What justification can there be for 
producing such an outcome?
Consequently, I think Justice Collins 
was mistaken to conclude that the 
Crimes Act prohibition on aid in dying 
is consistent with the section 8 right not 
to be deprived of life. That error may not 
have changed his honour’s conclusion as 
to how the Crimes Act can be interpreted. 
But his honour should have considered 
whether to issue a declaration that the 
current law is inconsistent with the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed in the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act.
In regards to Seales’ section 9 right, 
Justice Collins’ reasoning was more 
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robust. In line with overseas authority,5 
his honour found that the state’s 
prohibition on receiving aid in dying 
did not subject Seales to ‘treatment’ at 
all (Seales, at [205]-[207]). Consequently, 
while the effect of the prohibition may be 
cruel, degrading and disproportionately 
severe, this did not trigger the relevant 
right under the Bill of Rights Act.
Other findings in the judgment
While the practical effect of Justice 
Collins’ judgment is that, for the moment, 
a doctor cannot lawfully provide aid in 
dying even to a competent, terminally ill 
patient, there are additional aspects of his 
Honour’s judgment worth highlighting as 
we consider the next steps to take. As his 
Honour notes: ‘Although Ms Seales [did] 
not obtain[] the outcomes she sought, she 
has selflessly provided a forum to clarify 
important aspects of New Zealand law’ 
(Seales, at [211]). In the course of the trial 
a great deal of evidence was proffered on 
some contested matters relating to aid in 
dying. This enabled Justice Collins to draw 
some important factual conclusions. 
The first conclusion relates to 
arguments that aid in dying is unnecessary 
as it is possible to manage a dying person’s 
symptoms and concerns so that they do 
not suffer in the process. Justice Collins 
concluded from the evidence presented 
that existing palliative care could not 
guarantee Seales would not suffer pain 
during the dying process (Seales, at 
[37]-[43]), while ‘many of the experts, 
including those relied upon by the 
Attorney-General accept that palliative 
care may not be able to address Ms Seales’ 
psychological and emotional suffering’ 
(Seales, at [44]). Consequently, while aid 
in dying is by no means a replacement 
for good palliative care, neither can good 
palliative care provide a guarantee of a 
peaceful, painless, dignified ending. Just 
as importantly, the availability of aid in 
dying can provide a sense of control and 
reassurance to a patient facing the end of 
her life which complements the goals of 
palliative medicine (Seales, at [59]-[61]).
The second important conclusion is 
in respect of claims that if aid in dying 
is permitted, vulnerable groups inevitably 
will be victimised by the process. In 
particular, the Crown argued that no 
person could possibly properly consent 
to aid in dying, as all terminally ill people 
are in such a vulnerable state. Once again, 
Justice Collins rejected this assertion on 
the evidence before him. His Honour 
stressed that it is ‘important to ensure 
that medical judgements are not based 
upon assumptions as to vulnerability. To 
do otherwise would devalue respect for 
the principle of individual autonomy’ 
(Seales, at [81]). In respect of Seales’ 
own position, Collins J found that the 
‘statement of her belief that she is not 
vulnerable must be respected. Ms Seales’ 
application for the declarations she seeks 
is a rational and intellectually rigorous 
response to her circumstances’ (Seales, at 
[81]).
So after considering all the evidence 
given by experts on each side of the 
debate, Collins J found as a factual 
matter that there was no guarantee 
that medical science could give Seales a 
painless, dignified death. He also found 
that she was not in a vulnerable state 
when she asked to have control over 
the circumstances of her own death so 
as to avoid the possibility of a painful, 
undignified death; indeed, her decision 
to seek this was one worthy of our full 
respect. 
These factual findings then 
underpinned this important conclusion 
later in Justice Collins’ judgment:
By focusing upon the law it may 
appear that I am indifferent to 
Ms Seales’ plight. Nothing could 
be further from the truth. I fully 
acknowledge that the consequences 
of the law against assisting suicide 
as it currently stands are extremely 
distressing for Ms Seales and that she 
is suffering because that law does not 
accommodate her right to dignity and 
personal autonomy. (Seales, at [192] 
(emphasis added))
Therefore, while Justice Collins may 
have found that current law cannot 
provide Seales with access to aid in dying 
and that this outcome is consistent with 
the comparatively narrow range of rights 
protected by the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act, his Honour’s judgment by 
no means says that the law we have is 
desirable. To the contrary, preventing 
those in Lecretia Seales’ position from 
gaining access to aid in dying denies 
individuals very important individual 
rights. It forces them to die in undignified 
ways and so denies them recognition 
of their status as rational, competent 
individuals able to choose in their own 
best interests.
A law that has this effect on individual 
citizens is a bad one for us as a society. So 
when Justice Collins notes in his judgment 
that it is for Parliament to change the 
law, we should understand what lies 
behind his lament that this institution 
‘has shown little desire to engage in these 
issues’ (Seales, at [211]). It ought to do so, 
because while current law on this issue 
may be clear, it also is wrong.
Postscipt
Lecretia Seales passed away from natural 
causes the day before Justice Collins’ 
decision was publicly released.
1 One of the marks of disagreement in this field is that 
those on opposing sides cannot even agree on a common 
terminology for the matters at stake. I will use the term ‘aid 
in dying’ to refer to a fatal dose of medication provided at 
the request of a terminally ill, competent individual who is 
suffering intolerably for the purpose of ending his or her life 
at a time of his or her own choosing. If that marks me out 
as a proponent of legal change in this area, that is because I 
am.
2 [2015] NZHC 1239.
3 Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] SCC 5.
4 See Carter v Canada (Attorney General) [2015] SCC 5, at 
[77]-[78].
5 In particular, Roderiguez v British Columbia (Attorney 
General) [1993] 3 SCR 519; R (Pretty) v Department of 
Public Prosecutions [2001] UKHL 61; [2002] 1 AC 800.
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